Introspection, phenomenal contrast, and mathematical truths: elements for the cognitive phenomenology debate
Abstract
It has been suggested in the philosophy of mind that, contrasting with pure physical states, conscious states are those in which there is something that is like to be. Conscious states have a phenomenology. Assuming an intuitive distinction between sensory and cognitive conscious experiences, over the last years a debate has been established around the question about the phenomenal nature of our cognitive states, especially, our own thoughts. This has been called the cognitive phenomenology debate. A proper examination of the debate cannot be separated from a critical analysis of the ways in which we draw conclusions about the phenomenal components of our conscious lives. This paper examines some of the most fundamental problems deriving from the two main argumentative strategies used in the debate, namely, introspective reports and phenomenal contrasts. After analyzing how these strategies might support certain positions within the debate, the article explores how some aspects of the phenomenology of mathematical reasoning could enlighten the discussion.Keywords:
Cognitive phenomenology, Thoughts, Consciousness, Phenomenal properties, ExperienceReferences
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